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Taxation-Ships, Boats and Watercraft-Application of
Mileage Apportionment Doctrine
Taxation of ships, boats, and various watercraft has had some rather
peculiar twists over the years. Steamships running between New York,
New Orleans, Galveston, and Havana were allowed to be taxed by the
state of Kentucky,' notwithstanding the fact that none had ever been
in the state, nor ever were likely to be. This result was accomplished
because none of the vessels had ever acquired a tax situs elsewhere,
and Kentucky was the domicil of the owner. This has been the general
rule, with the exception being the case where a vessel engaged in interstate commerce had acquired an actual situs in a state other than the
place of the domicil of the owner ;2 and in order to have acquired a new
tax situs other than the domicil of the owner, the vessels must have
spent their time wholly within the new jurisdiction. 3 The rule, with
the exception, has been applied to vessels trading in interstate4 commerce
on the navigable rivers and waterways of the United States.
Recently a new tax pattern affecting transportation on inland waterways was enunciated. The United States Supreme Court has decided
that the principle of mileage apportionment heretofore used in taxing
railroads or railroad cars 5 and telephone, telegraph and express companies6 may be used to tax watercraft engaged in transportation on
inland waters.

7

The state of Louisiana and the city of New Orleans levied ad valorem
taxes on tugs and barges belonging to foreign corporations engaged in
carrying freight up and down the Mississippi and Ohio rivers, stopping
only for unloading, reloading, and necessary repairs in New Orleans.
Of the total time spent in interstate commerce for preceding years the
amount spent by these vessels in Louisiana ranged from 2.2% to a
maximum of 17.5%. The tax was apportioned on the ratio between
the total number of miles of the corporations' lines in Louisiana to the
total number of miles of the entire line. The Supreme Court reversed
decisions of the district court s and the circuit court of appeals0 whose
ISouthern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63 (1911).
'Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409 (1905).
'Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299 (1905).
'Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409 (1905).
'Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1890) ; Pittsburgh
C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421 (1893). In addition to the mileage
apportionment doctrine, the Supreme Court has held that railroad cars may be
taxed according to the average number of cars which are found to be physically
present within a state. Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158
(1943).
'Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194 (1896).
'Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line, 69 S. Ct. 432 (1949).
'American Barge Line v. Cave, 69 F. Supp. 30 (E. D. La. 1946).
'Ott v. De Bardeleben Coal Corp., 166 F. 2d 509 (C. C. A. 5th 1948).
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decisions that the tax was invalid under the due process clause of the
14th amendment were based upon the finding that the taxed boats and
barges had never acquired a tax"situs in Louisiana.
The rulings of the lower courts are bolstered by the argument in
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota,'° where Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority said: "But the doctrine of apportionment has neither in theory nor in practice been applied to tax units of
interstate commerce visiting for fractional periods of the taxing year....
The continuous protection by a state other than the domiciliary statethat is, protection throughout the tax year-has furnished the constitutional basis for tax apportionment in these interstate commerce situations,
and it is on that basis that the tax laws have been framed and
administered."
The Supreme Court in the principal case distinguished the cases
stating the general rule, saying the element of apportionment was not
involved or considered in those earlier cases.-' On the element of employment of the vessels in Louisiana for the whole of the taxable year,
the court said it would not stop to resolve the question, as the AttorneyGeneral for Louisiana stated in his brief that the Louisiana tax statute
was intended to cover and actually covered an average portion of property permanently within the state, and by permanently was meant
throughout the taxing year. Thus the decision overruled nothing, but
it certainly makes available a new tax formula whereby states along an
inland waterway may tax commerce which was heretofore taxable only
at the owner's domicil or at an actual tax situs.
The meaning of the language used by the court, "an average portion
of property permanently within the state," is not clear. It obviously
cannot mean that in order for Louisiana to tax a tug or barge, that the
tug or barge must be at all times within the borders of Louisiana. If
a tug or barge remains in Louisiana throughout the taxing year, no2
problem arises, for automatically a tax situs in Louisiana is acquired,'
and the state of Louisiana has full taxing power.
If the language means that Louisiana must determine the average
number of vessels within the state in a given year, give that average
10322 U. S. 292, 297 (1943).

And again at page 298: "But no judicial restric-

tion has been applied against the domiciliary state except when property (or a

portion of fungible units) is permanently situated in a state other than the
domiciliary state, and permanently means continuously throughout the year, not a
fraction thereof, whether days or weeks. Such was the unanimous decision in the
Miller case (N. Y. Central & H. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584 (1906)) or

the Miller
case decided nothing."
1

" Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 17 How. 596 (1854); City of St. Louis v.
Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423 (1870); Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471
(1872); Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409 (1905); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63 (1911).
'2 Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299 (1905).
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number a valuation, and then superimpose the mileage apportionment
doctrine before determining the tax, the state is unduly restricted in
the assessment valuation. It is the view of the writer that if the words
of the court are construed literally, such an interpretation will result.
However, the probable meaning is otherwise, and if interpreted with
a common sense view, this decision permits a just apportionment of tax
among states affected by inland water transportation. The court was
not attempting to lay down any detailed formula for a tax system, but
only the broad principle that inland water vessels engaged in interstate
commerce may be taxed on the same basis as railroad cars.
The difficulty in applying this broad principle lies in the fact that
while railroads operate on daily schedules, sending a large number of
cars through a state on a day-to-day basis, tugs and barges are irregularly operated, and the number of units, if any at all, inside the borders
of any given state at a particular time will vary widely. Consequently,
the words continuous protection must either be omitted from expressions
of the constitutional basis for tax apportionment referring to inland
water commerce, or else be interpreted to mean continuous protection
to the right to carry on business within a state.
In working out a tax method which will fit within the framework
of this decision, one must consider first of all, that if vessels only incidentally and sporadically visit a port or ports within a state, that state
cannot'3 and should not tax such vessels. Assuming a degree of regularity and continuity of visits, what is an equitable tax basis which
allows a reasonable source of revenue to the state and which will not
be a burden on commerce because of a cumulative effect of several states
imposing such a tax? A logical and fair system, and one within a reasonable interpretation of this case, would be: (1) a determination of
the value of all tugs and barges belonging to a company doing a regular
business in a state, and then excepting from that valuation all tugs and
barges used exclusively outside the state; (2) apply to the remaining
valuation the fraction obtained by putting the total number of miles of
the company's lines within the state over the total number of miles of
the company's entire line;14 (3) apply the appropriate property tax
figure to the result.
For example, assume a company owns 20 tugs and 100 barges,
whose total value is $1,000,000. Ten tugs and 50 barges never enter
the state proposing to tax. If the tugs and barges never entering the
state were one-half of the total value, then the taxing state has left
$500,000 in step (1). If the tugs and barges run 100 miles into the
3

Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 17 How. 596 (1854).

" Or as an alternative, if the average number doctrine is used in a state as a

tax basis, the mileage apportionment should be omitted.

1949]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

state, and the total miles of their entire run is 500 miles, then a figure
of 100 over 500, or 1 over 5 is the figure for step (2). Applying onefifth to $500,000, the state has a valuation of $100,000 which it can tax.
If the tax rate is one dollar on $100 valuation, then the tax to be
assessed against the company results as $1,000 in step (3).
Since 1905, North Carolina has had a statute 15 providing for taxing
of canal and steamboat companies in the same manner as provided for
railroads, and so would seem to be in line with this latest decision of
the United States Supreme Court on the point. No cases seem to have
arisen under the North Carolina statute.
Only one North Carolina case dealing with the tax situs of boats
has been found. In Texas Co. v. Elizabeth City' boats were employed
by the Texas Co., a Delaware corporation, to haul oil products on North
Carolina rivers and sounds and into Virginia. Elizabeth City was allowed
by our court to levy an ad valorem tax on the boats on a finding by the
jury in the lower court that for tax purposes the situs of the boats was
in Elizabeth City. That this decision failed to square with prior federal
decisions is pointed out in a prior note in this REVIEW.' 7
BASIL SHERRILL.

Trusts-Chatritable Bequests-Application of Cy Pres Doctrine
The testator, Ackland, willed the bulk of his fortune to his executors
as trustees for the purpose of building and maintaining a memorial art
museum on the campus of Duke University. Duke declined the "benefits, burdens and responsibilities" of the trust and the heirs sued the
trustees, claiming the fortune resulted to them, but the trust was upheld
by the invocation of the cy pres doctrine.' The court ordered the trustees to investigate to see whether the University of North Carolina or
2
Rollins College or either of them should be selected as the new site.
The trustees, after two years of investigation, recommended North
Carolina because of its similarity to Duke in size, financial status, location, cultural influende, faculty and curricula. The trial court, however,
selected Rollins as the site because of evidence of its more prominent
art department and Rollins' contention that the University of North
11 N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-371 (1943).
18210
N. C. 454, 187 S. E. 551 (1936).
17.15 N. C. L. REv. 217 (1937).
1 Noel v. Olds, 138 F. 2d 581 (App. D. C. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 773
(1944). The court found that the testator's primary purpose was to benefit art
education in the South. The fact that a previous will had named Duke, University of North Carolina and Rollins, in that order, tended to show that he had no
special interest in Duke nor any intent to benefit it exclusively.
' See note 1 supra.

